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COMMENTS 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-ACCOUNTING METHODS-AC-
COUNTING FOR PREPAYMENTS AND ESTIMATED FUTURE EXPENSES-
"It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce 
revenue ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular 
intervals."1 In order to obtain regular periodic revenues from the 
federal income tax, Congress requires all taxpayers to determine 
their taxable income annually.2 
Income may be defined as "value added" as a result of a given 
economic activity.3 Logically, the most opportune time to measure 
income occurs whenever that activity has ended, for at that time 
the continuous growth or contraction in the attributable value will 
likewise have ended and the income or loss from the activity will 
be readily susceptible to measurement. The fragmentation of this 
period of activity into an annual period, as demanded by Congress, 
requires an attempt to measure a continuously changing quantum 
of income. Business activity does not cease and begin anew at the 
end of each taxable year; thus, some transactions will necessarily 
span such artificial limits. Consequently, the determination of tax-
able income requires the implementation of accounting methods 
which will wholly or partially exclude or include such transactions 
in the current taxable year. 
The need for yearly accounting may also arise apart from tax 
considerations. Reports of annual business income are required by 
government agencies,4 stock exchanges,° and shareholders.6 In ad-
1 Stone, J., in Burnet v. Sanford &: Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931). 
2 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 44l(a). 
3 "The net worth method of estimating taxable income is a logical derivation of the 
net accretion definition of income •••• " Morag, Some Economic Aspects of Two Admin-
istrative Methods of Estimating Taxable Income, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 176, 179 (1957). See 
generally Avakian, Net Worth Computations as Proof of Tax Evasion, 10 TAX L. R.Ev. 
431 (1955). 
4 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 7, Schedule A § 26, 48 Stat. 88, 90, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa(26) (1958); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 48 Stat. 894, 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1958); Interstate Commerce Act § 20(1)-(3), 54 Stat. 916 (1940), 
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20(1)-(3) (1958); Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 407(a), 72 Stat. 
766, 49 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (1958); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 1701.38 (Page Supp. 1961). Many 
government agencies may promulgate uniform rules of accounting to be used in filing 
annual reports. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 20(3), 54 Stat. 916 (1940), 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20(3) (1958). 
Ii NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL § A4 (1953). 
6 See generally BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 159-61 (1946); 2 HORNSTEIN, CoRPORA-
TION LAW AND PRACTICE § 612 (1959). 
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dition, the level of annual income is the most important influence 
on the management of business operations7 and the determination 
of financial policies.8 In the business community, the responsibility 
for the formation and application of accounting methods has been 
generally entrusted to professional accountants. After an unsuccess-
ful attempt to measure business income with accounting methods 
based on cash receipts and disbursements, Congress expanded the 
permissible tax accounting methods to allow accrual accounting, 
the method used by professional accountants.9 However, as a con-
trol measure Congress gave the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
the right to reject any method of accounting which did not clearly 
reflect income.10 While a determination of taxable income made 
according to generally accepted accounting principles has usually 
been allowed for tax purposes, the Commissioner has consistently 
rejected such determinations when they have involved prepaid in-
come or estimated future expenses.11 
The widely divergent views held by the Internal Revenue 
Service and professional accountants in regard to the proper ac-
counting treatment for these types of transactions have resulted 
in a substantial amount of litigation, which began soon after the 
adoption of the accrual method of accounting for tax purposes. 
However, this litigation has not clearly defined acceptable methods 
of tax accounting for prepaid income and estimated future ex-
penses. Instead, it has seemingly rendered the question incapable 
of resolution in the absence of an articulate redefinition of the 
applicable accounting provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.12 
Since the fulfillment of this objective apparently requires a choice 
between the methods advocated by the accounting profession and 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the initial step toward 
suc:.h a redefinition lies in an investigation of the relative merits 
of their proposals. 
1 PATON &: PATON, CORPORATION ACCOUNTS AND STATEMENTS 275 (1955). 
8 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL PoLICY OF CORPORATIONS 509-10, 519-20, 530-34 (5th ed. 1953). 
9 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463 § I3(d), 39 Stat. 756 [now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 446(c)]. 
10 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463 § 13(d), 39 Stat. 756 [now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 446(b)]. See H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1916). 
11 See Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 181; l P-H 1962 FED. TAX SERv. ,r,f 6282-90, 
6453. 
12 Krahmer, Taxation of Prepaid Receipts-Ambiguity of Supreme Court Decision 
in American Automobile Association v. United States Expected To Cause Further Con-
fusion, 47 A.B.A.J. 1218, 1221 (1961). 
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I. GENERALLY ACCEPTED AccOUNTING STANDARDS FOR PREPAID 
1NCOME13 AND ESTIMATED FUTURE EXPENSES14 
A professional accountant defines "income" as a net or result-
ant amount determined by matching revenues15 with related ex-
penses.16 Income, so defined, does not exist prior to the sale of 
goods or performance of services.17 Payments received prior to 
performance, which have been denominated as "prepaid income," 
are regarded simply as advance deposits.18 The advance of cash 
is treated as creating a debt obligation running from the seller 
to the advancing purchaser for the full amount received.19 Nor-
mally this obligation will be discharged by the delivery of goods 
or the rendition of services. When this occurs, the accountant will 
include the amount of the deposit in the stream of revenues which 
are included in the current determination of income.20 Such an 
accounting procedure has the effect of deferring recognition of the 
monies advanced until they have been actually earned.21 Thus, 
13 The term "prepaid income" is derived from the title of § 452 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 repealed by ch. 143 § 1, 69 Stat. 134 (1955). Other terms com• 
monly used to describe such transactions are deferred revenues, deferred credits, and 
advances from customers. See FINNEY 8: MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING, INTRODUC• 
TORY 367 (5th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as FINNEY]; LENHART 8: DEFLIESE, MONTGOM• 
ERY'S AUD111NG 327 (8th ed. 1957): PATON, EssENTIALS OF ACCOUNTING, 313-15 (rev. ed. 
1949) [hereinafter cited as PATON]. 
14 The term "estimated future expenses" is derived from the title of § 462 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 repealed by ch. 143 § 1, 69 Stat. 134 (1955). 
15 Revenue may be defined as the amount of cash, receivables, or other valid assets 
added to the resources of the business as a result of transferring products to customers. 
PATON 77. 
16 FINNEY 367. This definition has also been used by the courts. See United States 
v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1926); Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 
520, 523 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 181; Beacon Publishing 
Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 699 (10th Cir. 1955). But cf. Burnet v. Sanford 8: 
Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931); Spencer, White 8: Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 
45, 47' (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944). 
17 PATON 77-78. 
18 PATON 313-15. 
10 FINNEY 361; PATON 46-47, 312-16. "The term current liabilities is used principally 
to designate obligations whose liquidation is reasonably expected to require the use of 
existing resources properly classifiable as current assets, or the creation of other current 
liabilities • • • • [T]he classification is intended to include • • • collections received in 
advance of the delivery of goods or performance of services • • • ." CoMMilTEE ON Ac-
COUNTING PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING 
REsEARCH BULLETIN No. 43, 21-22 (1953). But see LENHART 8: DEFLIESE, op. cit. supra 
note 13, at 327, "Current liabilities should include the portion of these deferred credits 
equal to the estimated cost of realizing such reve~ues in the following period. The 
remaining portion of unearned revenues, representmg profit, may be excluded from 
current liabilities and designated as deferred income." (Emphasis supplied.) 
20 FINNEY 367; PATON 312-16. 
21 Ibid. 
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the accountant recognizes the revenues as earned in the year in 
which the seller has performed, regardless of the time when pay-
ment was actually received. This accounting treatment acknowl-
edges income as being earned only after the risk of performing the 
obligation required by the pertinent sales contract has been ter-
minated and the cost of performance accurately ascertained. On 
the other hand, it prevents the recognition as income of advances 
from customers which may have to be returned because of the 
seller's inability to perform as required by the sales contract.22 
The professional accountant recognizes estimated future ex-
penses when the current performance of a contract to deliver goods 
or render services creates an incidental obligation in the seller which 
may require him to incur additional expenses at some future time. 
Instead of deferring the recognition of a portion of the revenue from 
the sale transaction until such time as the future expenses are in-
curred, accepted accounting procedures require inclusion of the 
total revenue in the current determination of income when the 
contract has been substantially performed, and the simultaneous 
deduction of all the related expenses, including a reasonable esti-
mate for future expenses.23 The obligation to incur future expense 
is then treated as a current liability which will be discharged when 
the expense is incurred.24 Unlike other current liabilities, obliga-
tions to incur estimated future expenses may be accrued although 
there may be no certain sums owed to specific persons.25 Common 
examples of estimated future expenses involve obligations arising 
under agreements to provide free services on the seller's products 
and agreements to install goods on the buyer's premises. However, 
it is essential that the expenses accrued be related to the current 
production of revenues.26 Accordingly, deductions from current 
revenues normally are not allowed for the estimated cost of future 
22 FINNEY 309; PATON 315. 
23 FINNEY 309, 367; PATON 352; LENHART & DEFLIESE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 329. 
24 FINNEY 309; PATON & PATON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 414. 
25 FINNEY & OLDBERG, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING 165 (1955). "This concept of 
current liabilities would include estimated or accrued amounts which are expected to 
be required to cover expenditures within the year for known obligations (a) the amount 
of which can be determined only approximately (as in the case of provisions for 
accruing bonus payments) or (b) where the specific person or persons to whom payment 
will be made cannot as yet be designated (as in the case of estimated costs to be 
incurred in connection with guaranteed servicing or repair of products already sold)." 
CoMMITl"EE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 22. 
26 FINNEY 367. 
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fire losses, or future strikes.27 Generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples also make no allowance for the deduction of future expenses 
which cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy, even if re-
lated to current production of revenues.28 As an example, prospec-
tive losses arising due to injuries sustained by the purchaser of a 
defective product normally may not be deducted in the year the 
article was produced. 
An alternative to deducting estimated future expenses would 
be to defer recognition of that portion of current receipts which 
corresponds to the cost of providing the future services.29 Thus, 
when a product is sold under an agreement to provide free main-
tenance services for a given period, the portion of the current re-
ceipts from the sale which represents the amount the seller would 
charge for such service would be excluded from the determination 
of income until the service is rendered.30 In short, this alternative 
procedure would treat a portion of the current revenue from such 
sales as "prepaid income." 
While it is often said that the same result can be achieved using 
either method,31 this statement is only a half-truth. Although it 
is true that either procedure will result in matching revenues with 
related expenses, the matching, and therefore the recognition of 
income, will often take place in different taxable years. For ex-
ample, where future services are required in a sales contract, if 
estimated future expenses are deducted, all income from the sale 
is recognized in the year the product is sold. If the alternative 
procedure of deferring a portion of the receipts is adopted, a por-
tion of the income will be deferred to the year or years in which 
the services are rendered. 
Thus, deferring a portion of current revenues is an alternative 
to deducting estimated future expenses where the future obliga-
27 CoMMI1TEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING REsEARCH BULLETIN No. 53 § 7(a) (1958); PATON 746. 
28 See CoMMI1TEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 27, § 7(e): "The 
Committee is therefore of the opinion that reserves such as those created ••• in amounts 
not determined on the basis of any reasonable estimates of costs or losses are of such a 
nature that charges or credits relating to such reserves should not enter into the deter• 
mination of net income." 
29 PATON &: PATON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 340-45. See, e.g., Bressner Radio, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 181. 
so Ibid. 
31 See, e.g., Olincy, Taxability and Deductibility of Prepaid Income and Expense, 
U. So. CAL. 1961 TAX INsr. 415, 434. 
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tions are incidental to the contract for goods or services. On the 
other hand, generally accepted accounting principles require the 
deferring of advance payments absent the current performance of 
such contract.32 In such a case, the obligation to incur future ex-
penses would not be incidental to current operations. For this 
reason, attempts to manipulate the periodic determination of in-
come by deducting the estimated cost of the goods sold or services 
rendered from payments made in advance in order to recognize 
the income from the transaction before it has been earned by the 
performance of the contract are disfavored by professional account-
ants. 
II. TAX AccoUNTING STANDARDS FOR PREPAID INCOME AND 
ESTIMATED FUTURE EXPENSES 
The Internal Revenue Code allows taxpayers to determine 
their taxable income according to the method of accounting regu-
larly used in keeping their books, provided the method used clearly 
reflects income.33 Since the essence of the accrual method of ac-
counting is the determination of income by matching revenues 
and expenses, 34 taxpayers using that method determine taxable 
income by deducting from gross income35 the expenses attributable 
to the earning of that income during the taxable year. The 
Internal Revenue Code provides: 
"The amount of any item of gross income shall be included 
in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by 
the taxpayer, unless, under the method of accounting used in 
computing taxable income, such amount is to be properly 
accounted for as of a different period. 36 ••• The amount of any 
deduction or credit allowed ... shall be taken for the taxable 
year which is the proper taxable year under the method of 
accounting used in computing taxable income."37 
Under these Code provisions, the proper time for the inclusion of 
receipts and the deduction of expenses is largely controlled by the 
method of accounting used by the taxpayer. It would seem, there-
32 Authorities cited notes 24, 26 8e 27 supra. 
33 INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 446. 
34 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1926). See also FINNEY 367. 
35 For an applicable definition of gross income, see INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 61. 
36 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 45l(a). 
37 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 46l(a). 
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fore, that a taxpayer using the accrual method should, as dis-
cussed in the preceding section, defer prepayments until the tax-
able year in which the related obligation to deliver goods or render 
services is discharged; likewise, estimated future expenses should 
be deductible in the taxable year in which the related revenues are 
included in the computation of taxable income. However, both 
of these generally accepted accounting procedures have been re-
jected by the Commissioner on the ground that they do not clearly 
reflect income.38 Consequently, taxpayers are required to include 
prepayments in the computation of taxable income when they are 
received, and are denied the right to deduct future expenses which 
are related to the current production of taxable income.89 To sub-
stantiate this position, the Commissioner has resorted to four basic 
and rather separate contentions. 
A. The "Taxable Year" Concept 
At first, the rejection of taxpayers' attempts to match revenues 
with related expenses through the use of professional accounting 
procedures was based on the Treasury's concept of the annual 
accounting period.40 It was felt that any attempt to match revenues 
and related expenses not occurring in the same taxable year was 
a departure from a periodic determination of income.41 The rule 
that income should not be determined on a transaction basis re-
ceived its first approval in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,42 a 
case in which the taxpayer had entered into an unprofitable dredg-
ing contract. After completion of the work, however, the taxpayer 
sued for breach of warranty as to a certain aspect of the job and 
recovered the losses it had suffered during the prior three 'years. 
The Court held that the taxpayer could not amend prior returns 
38 Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 181 (prepaid income); 3 CCH 1962 STAND. Fm. TAX 
REP. ,i 2916.08 (estimated future expenses). But cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 455, 456; 
Rev. Rul. 446, 1955-2 CuM. BuLL. 531 (allowing accrual of bonuses); Rev. Rul. 608, 
1954-2 CUM. BULL. 8 (allowing accrual of vacation pay). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ch. 852, § 41, 45 Stat. 805 (1928) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 441). 
41 Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938); Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 
359 (1931); Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944); Blum v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1934). But cf. 
American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 701 (1961) (dissenting opinion); 
Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1951). See also Krahmer, Taxation 
of Advance Receipts for Future Services, 1961 DuKE L.J. 230, 242. 
42 282 U.S. 359 (1931). 
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to offset the losses sustained under the contract with the income 
received from the damage award. Properly construed, however, 
this case merely prevents the matching of losses and earnings de-
rived from a transaction in different tax.able years;43 it does not 
apply to the matching of revenues and expenses. Further clarifica-
tion was necessary in order to apply this doctrine to the proper 
allocation of expenses and revenues.44 
B. The "All Events" Rule 
The Commissioner's second ground for the rejection of profes-
sional accounting standards for prepayments and estimated future 
expenses was based on the so-called "all events" rule.45 This rule, 
as originally formulated, called for the inclusion of revenues in the 
tax.able year in which all the events have occurred which are neces-
sary to fix their amount and the tax.payer's right to receive them;46 
in like manner, the deduction of expenses must be postponed until 
the tax.able year in which all the events have occurred which are 
necessary to establish the fact and the amount of the tax.payer's 
liability.47 When this rule is applied to prepaid income, it would 
seem that all the events necessary to determine the tax.payer's right 
to such prepayments have not occurred until they have been 
"earned" in the accounting sense-a position contrary to that 
taken by the Commissioner.48 
Although completely disregarding the "all events" rule in the 
case of prepaid income, the Commissioner has successfully used it 
to bolster his position with respect to estimated future expenses.49 
Early cases before the Board of Tax Appeals denied deduction for 
these items on the ground that all the events necessary to determine 
43 Goodhue, Claim of Right and Changes in Accounting Method, N.Y.U. 18TH !Nsr. 
ON FED. TAX 209, 213-14 (1960); Krahmer, supra note 41, at 243-45. 
44 Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1951). 
411 See United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926). 
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)l(ii) (1957). 
47 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)l(ii) 
(1957). 
48 Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., 
Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 181. 
40 See, e.g., New Capitol Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1958), 
affirming per curiam 28 T.C. 706 (1957); Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 
F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1944); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commis• 
sioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.), affirming 1 T.C. 529 (1943); South Dade Farms, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943); Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc., 32 T.C. 
906 (1959); National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947). 
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the amount of the expense and the fact of the taxpayer's liability 
had not yet occurred. In Uvalde Co.,50 the taxpayer had paved cer-
tain streets under a contract which required him to maintain them 
for a period of several years. The taxpayer, computing taxable in-
come by the accrual method, included revenues from the trans-
action in gross income and deducted an estimate of the future 
maintenance expenses. The Board denied the deduction because 
no liability for any expense had been incurred within the taxable 
year. A mere contractual obligation to perform services in the 
future does not meet the "all events" test; payment, or a specific 
obligation to pay for the services, is required. In addition, the fact 
that the obligation to incur expense in the future was contingent 
provided the Board with an alternative ground for decision. Under 
either approach, application of the "all events" rule in this context 
has effectively denied taxpayers the right to deduct estimated 
future expenses in the taxable year in which related revenues were 
included in the computation of taxable income. 
Since its inception, the "all events" rule has been modified to 
the extent that a deduction will be allowed in the year in which 
all the events necessary to establish the fact of the liability have 
occurred, provided the amount of the liability can be estimated 
with reasonable accuracy.51 However, there has been no change 
in the treatment of estimated future expenses by the Tax Court or 
the Commissioner. This was demonstrated in National Bread 
Wrapping Mach. Co.,52 where the taxpayer sold machinery to 
be installed on the purchaser's premises during the subsequent 
taxable year. The taxpayer reported all revenue from the trans-
action and deducted a reasonable estimate for the prospective in-
stallation costs. The deduction was disallowed on the ground that 
all the events necessary to determine the fact of liability would not 
occur until the services were performed giving rise to the obliga-
tion to pay for the labor used in installing the machinery. Thus, 
the requirement of an existing obligation to pay money as dis-
tinguished from an obligation to perform services is still applied 
by the Commissioner and the Tax Court to deny a deduction for 
estimated future expenses. However, the distinction between money 
obligations and performance obligations has not received consist-
50 1 B.T.A. 932 (1925). 
51 Treas. Reg. § I.461-l(a)(2) (1957). 
52 30 T.C. 550 (1958). 
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ent application by the various courts of appeals.53 In Harrold v. 
Commissioner, 54 the taxpayer operated a strip coal mine. Mining 
laws required him to refill the area excavated to reach the coal. Al-
though the backfilling operations would not commence until a 
future taxable year, the taxpayer deducted an estimate of the back-
filling expense attributable to current operations. The Commis-
sioner's disallowance was sustained by the Tax Court because the 
petitioner had not incurred any liability in the taxable year for 
the payment of amounts required to refill the excavation.55 On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. All 
the events necessary to determine the fact of the taxpayer's liability 
had occurred in the taxable year and the amount of the liability 
could be estimated with reasonable accuracy. The court did not 
address itself to the distinction between a performance obligation 
and an obligation to pay money. 
It should be observed that the future performance obligation 
in Harrold was not contingent; therefore, the reasons relied on by 
the Tax Court in Uvalde Co. were not fully contravened. The 
question of whether the cost of contingent future performance 
obligations should be deductible is of utmost importance in ac-
counting for estimated future expenses. Contingent future per-
formance obligations include new product warranties and other 
service obligations undertaken in connection with the sale of 
goods, obligations which might well provide significant deductions, 
if allowed. While it is impossible to estimate the future expense 
associated with the sale of a single product, the aggregate future 
expenses associated with the sale of many articles of the same type 
can often be estimated with remarkable accuracy.56 However, if 
the form of the transaction, rather than its substance, is to con-
trol the deductibility of estimated future expenses from contingent 
future obligations, the taxpayer will have to convince the Com-
53 Compare Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959); Schuessler 
v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956); Pacific Grape Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 
219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955); Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951), 
with Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 
U.S. 874 (1952); Capital Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1948); 
Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 
U.S. 750 (1944); Amalgamated Housing Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 
1940), affirming per curiam 37 B.T.A. 817 (1938). 
54 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951). 
r,5 Paul Harrold, 16 T.C. 134 (1951). 
uO See Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1931). 
158 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
missioner and the courts that a liability has been incurred although 
the obligation to perform may be contingent. Under the "all 
events" rule, the Commissioner has successfully asserted his con-
tention that a contingent future performance obligation does not 
establish the fact of the taxpayer's liability until the contingency 
has been resolved.117 Under this view, the future expense of such 
obligations would not be deductible. On the other hand, it may be 
argued that all the events necessary to establish the fact of the tax-
payer's liability have occurred when he has agreed to render a 
contingent future performance, and the contingency merely makes 
the amount of the liability less susceptible to estimation with 
reasonable accuracy. This view, if accepted, would permit the 
deduction of future performance obligations provided they could 
be estimated with reasonable accuracy. 
In Milwaukee &- Suburban Transp. Corp.58 the Tax Court sus-
tained the Commissioner's disallowance of a deduction for the 
estimated future expenses from personal injury claims which arose 
from the operation of its buses during the taxable year. In doing 
so, the court reviewed the accuracy with which individual claims 
were estimated notwithstanding the taxpayer's argument that the 
amount deducted reflected the aggregate claims expense with 
reasonable accuracy. However, the Milwaukee case involved dis-
puted liabilities rather than contingent obligations such as sales 
warranties (where the taxpayer's liability is admitted). The deduct-
ibility of disputed liabilities has been frequently discussed in con-
nection with deductions for estimated future expenses, although 
they are clearly distinguishable. It is reasonable to deny the tax-
payer the right to deduct amounts which in good faith he does not 
believe he will incur as expenses. 59 In addition, it has been sug-
gested that allowing the deduction of disputed liabilities would 
encourage the manipulation of the year in which taxable income 
is reported.60 Therefore, it is suggested that there are sufficient in-
. 
57 Streight Radio & T.V., Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 127 (1959), af/'d on other 
grounds, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961). Cf. American 
Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 692 (1961). 
58 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 904 (1959). 
59 See, e.g., Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 284 (1944); Dixie 
Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944). Cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
United States, 279 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1960), af/'d, 366 U.S. 380 (1961), 60 MICH. L. REv. 
383 (1962). 
60 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, supra note 59, at 157; Powell, New 
Developments in Accruals, N.Y.U. 19TH: lNsr. ON FED. TAX 1337, 1357-58 (1961). 
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dependent reasons for finding that all the events necessary to 
establish the fact of the taxpayer's disputed liability cannot be 
established until the dispute has been resolved. But the decision 
in Milwaukee and other disputed liability cases should not neces-
sarily conclude the taxpayer's right to aggregate admitted obliga-
tions in order that the future expenses may be estimated with 
reasonable accuracy. 
C. The "Claim of Right" Doctrine 
Thirdly, the Internal Revenue Service turned to the "claim of 
right" doctrine to justify the Commissioner's contention that pre-
payments must be included in the computation of taxable income 
for the year received, even though they are not earned until a 
subsequent taxable year.61 The claim of right doctrine, which 
originated in North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet,62 requires a tax-
payer who has received earnings under a claim of right and with-
out restriction as to their disposition to report them as taxable in-
come in the year in which they were received even though he may 
still be required to restore their equivalent. In the North Am. Oil 
case, the taxpayer had received income which it would have to 
restore if it could not successfully defend its title to the land from 
which the income was derived. The taxpayer prevailed in the title 
dispute and claimed the income should be reported in the taxable 
year in which the suit was settled. The Supreme Court held the 
income was properly reported in the taxable year in which it was 
received. Two years later, in Brown v. Helvering,63 the Court 
further refined the claim of right doctrine by denying a taxpayer 
the right to deduct an estimate of the income he might have to 
restore. In both of these cases, it was clear that the claim of right 
doctrine was used to determine the proper period for reporting net 
income. Thus, this is not authority for the proposition that the 
mere receipt of a prepayment determines its year of inclusion.64 
61 See, e.g., New Capitol Hotel v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1958), affi,rming 
per curiam 28 T.C. 706 (1957); Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1944); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner, 
139 F.2d ll!0 (3d Cir.), affi,rming l T.C. 529 (1943); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commis• 
sioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943); Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc., 32 T.C. 906 (1959); 
National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947). 
62 286 U.S. 417 (1932). 
as 291 U.S. 193 (1934). 
64 Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., 
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However, the Commissioner and the Tax Court have relied upon 
the claim of right doctrine to require the inclusion of prepayments 
in the taxable year of receipt. In E. B. Elliott Co.,65 the Board of 
Tax Appeals required the taxpayer to "include prepaid rentals in 
its current determination of taxable income on the ground that 
the taxpayer had the unrestricted use of the cash received. The 
Board did not recognize the offsetting liability of the taxpayer to 
perform its obligation or restore the money advanced. In Wallace 
A. Moritz,66 the Tax Court required the taxpayer, a professional 
photographer, to include deposits on picture orders in his deter-
mination of taxable income for the year in which they were re-
ceived. The deposits were to be refunded if the customers did not 
accept the finished pictures. Again the court relied on the claim 
of right doctrine~ indicating that the taxpayer had the unrestricted 
use of the funds deposited. 
While the Tax Court has continued to rely on the claim of 
right doctrine, courts of appeals have not consistently applied it 
in prepaid income cases.67 In Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commis-
sioner,68 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the 
Tax Court's decision which had required the taxpayer to include 
prepaid newspaper subscriptions in taxable income for the year 
in which they were received. The court held the claim of right 
doctrine was not applicable to prepayments because there was no 
dispute as to the ownership of the funds.69 It was recognized that 
acceptance of the claim of right ,doctrine would require the tax-
payer to report prepayments as if he were using the cash receipts 
Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 181; Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 
697, 700 (10th Cir. 1955). Cf. American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 
700 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 191 
(1957) (dissenting opinion). See Goodhue, supra note 43, at 232. 
65 45 B.T .A. 82 (1941). 
66 21 T.C. 622 (1954). 
67 Compare Schlude v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam, 
367 U.S. 911, modified, 368 U.S. 873 (1961); Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 
F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 181; Beacon Publishing 
Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 6r;t/ (10th Cir. 1955), with Streight Radio & T.V., Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961); New Capitol 
Hotel v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1958), afferming per curiam 28 T.C. 706 
(1957); Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 
323 U.S. 750 (1944); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.), 
afferming 1 T.C. 529 (1943); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th 
Cir. 1943). 
68 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955). 
69 Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1955). 
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and disbursements method of accounting, although actually using 
the accrual method, thereby creating a hybrid accounting system 
which would not clearly reflect income.70 The claim of right-
doctrine as advanced by the Commissioner received a further set-
back in Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner71 when the court 
allowed the taxpayer to exclude prepayments received from the 
sale of repair services from its current determination of income. 
The court limited the claim of right doctrine to the situation in 
which it arose: the determination of the taxable year in which 
earned income must be reported. The court reviewed the deci-
sion in North Am. Oil and concluded that the Supreme Court 
"held only that money that was earned and held under a claim of 
right was includible in the year of receipt."72 
The Commissioner's contention that the claim of right doc-
trine required the inclusion of prepayments in the computation 
of taxable income when received was placed before the Supreme 
Court in Automobile Club v. Commissioner,73 where the taxpayer 
sought to reverse a Sixth Circuit decision which had relied on that 
doctrine to require the inclusion of prepaid membership dues.74 
The Court affirmed the decision, but in doing so, it disregarded 
the claim of right doctrine on which the Commissioner had relied. 
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated: 
"The Commissioner seeks to justify that course [the inclusion 
of prepayments] under the 'claim of right' doctrine announced 
in North American Oil v. Burnet .... However, that doctrine, 
it seems to me, comes into play only in determining whether 
the treatment of an item of income should be influenced by 
the fact that the right to receive or keep it is in dispute .... 
The Court, however, now bypasses the Commissioner's 'claim 
of right' argument, and rests its decision instead on the ground 
that the pro rata allocation of the membership dues in monthly 
amounts is purely artificial."75 
Yet, after the Automobile Club decision, the claim of right doc-
trine continued to be applied in both the Tax Court76 and the 
70 Id. at 701. 
71 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BULL, 181. 
72 Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 71, at 525. 
73 353 U.S. 180 (1957). 
M Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1956). 
75 Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 191-93 (1957). (Emphasis added.) 
76 Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc., 32 T.C. 906 (1959). 
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courts of appeals.77 In American Automobile Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner,78 the Supreme Court took a second look at the problem. 
Again, the Court required inclusion of prepayments in the com-
putation of taxable income when received without indicating 
reliance upon the claim of right doctrine. This was carefully 
presented in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, where 
it was said: 
"The Commissioner's basic argument against the deferred 
reporting of prepayments has traditionally been that such a 
method conflicts with a series of decisions of this Court which 
establish the so-called 'claim of right doctrine.' In this case 
the Government abandoned that argument with good reason. 
As four Circuits have correctly held, the claim of right doc-
trine furnishes no support for the Government's position. 
. . . A claim of right without 'restriction on . use' may be 
the crucial factor in determining that particular funds are 
includable in gross income . ... But it hardly follows that 
all such funds must necessarily be reported by an accrual 
basis taxpayer as income in the year of receipt, whether or 
not then earned."79 
Thus, it is possible that the Commissioner may have finally aban-
doned the claim of right doctrine with respect to prepayments. 
It is hoped that the Commissioner will act consistently and not 
reassert the claim of right doctrine in cases before those lower 
courts which have previously applied it to require the inclusion 
of prepayments when received. In this manner, it may be possible 
to obtain some uniformity of judicial thought on a correct basis 
for the inclusion or exclusion of such advances. 
D. The Automobile Club Decision 
In both the Automobile Club and American Automobile Ass'n 
cases the taxpayer had received prepayments in consideration for 
77 Streight Radio &: T.V., Inc. v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. 
denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961). 
78 367 U.S. 687 (1961). 
79 Id. at 699, 700. (Emphasis added.) Circuit court decisions cited with approval were 
Schlude v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960); Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959); Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 
1956); Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955). 
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future services, including some services which would be performed 
upon the happening of a contingency. Each taxpayer prorated 
the prepayment over the period during which he might be obli-
gated to render services, and included the portion allocated to the 
current year in its computation of taxable income. In Automo-
bile Club, the Court concluded that the Commissioner had not 
exceeded his authority because "the pro rata allocation of the 
membership dues in monthly amounts is purely artificial and 
bears no relation to the services which petitioner may in fact be 
called upon to render for the member."80 Thus, the Automobile 
Club decision provided the Commissioner with a fourth basis to 
support his contention that prepayments must be included in tax-
able income for the year of receipt. It should be noted that the 
Court distinguished Beacon Publishing and Schuessler v. Com-
missioner,81 indicating that it did not wish to pass upon the more 
difficult question presented where the time of future performance 
can be accurately determined. Consequently, it may be argued 
that the decision would sustain the Commissioner's position only 
in cases involving future obligations so contingent that the year 
of performance cannot be accurately determined. However, in 
Bressner Radio, Inc.,82 which also involved contingent future 
obligations, the Second Circuit rejected the Commissioner's ar-
gument that Automobile Club was dispositive of the case at bar. 
The court found that the taxpayer's deferral of prepayments "bore 
a carefully estimated relationship to the services petitioner would 
be called upon to render."83 Thus, it seemed that Automobile 
Club decision might not apply if the taxpayer could prove that the 
deferral of prepayments was not "artificial." The Government 
indicated it would not follow the Bressner decision. 84 In American 
Automobile Ass'n the Supreme Court granted certiorari85 in order 
to resolve the apparent conflict between Bressner and the deci-
sion of the Court of Claims which had sustained the Commis-
sioner's rejection of the Association's method of accounting.86 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision below, relying on its earlier 
80 Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 189 (1957). 
81 2!!0 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956). 
82 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959). See text at notes 71, 72 supra. 
as Id. at 529. 
84 Rev. Rul. 85, 1960·1 CUM. BuLL. 181. 
811 364 U.S. 813 (1960). 
86 181 F. Supp. 255 (Ct. Cl. 1960). 
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decision in Automobile Club. Although the taxpayer had sought 
to show that its correlation of cost and the period of deferral was 
justified by "proof of experience," evidence based on statistical 
computations of average monthly cost per member could not, 
without legislative authorization and over the objection of the 
Commissioner, be used as a basis for deferral.87 This decision ap-
parently is determinative of the taxpayer's right to defer prepay-
ments when the taxpayer has incurred a contingent future per-
formance obligation. However, it is suggested that, so limited, the 
Court's decision is subject to the same criticism mentioned in con-
nection with the deduction of the estimated expense of contingent 
future performance obligations-allowing the form of the trans-
action to control its substance.88 As the Court indicated, it is im-
possible to determine the future time or times the Association 
would have to render services on behalf of a member. However, 
when the memberships are viewed in the aggregate, an accurate 
determination of the portion of the prepaid dues earned within a 
given taxable year can be obtained by statistical estimation based 
upon past experience. If the purpose of tax accounting is to reflect 
income accurately, the Court seemingly should have concerned it-
self with the accuracy of the Association's estimate of dues which 
had been earned. Instead, the Court has apparently prohibited 
the use of such estimates without regard to the degree that they 
may accurately reflect income. However, Congress expressed dis-
satisfaction with the Court's result by the enactment of section 
45689 which provided for the deferral of prepaid membership dues. 
Speaking specifically to the Court's decision, the congressional com-
mittee report expressed approval of deferring prepaid membership 
dues because that method of accounting more clearly reflected in-
come than reporting dues in the taxable year received.9° Conse-
quently, it is not clear what weight will be given to this aspect of 
American Automobile Ass'n in future litigation. 
In American Automobile Ass'n, the Court announced an addi-
87 American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 691-93 (1961). 
88 American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, supra note 87, at 691. The Court 
continued to distinguish Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 
1959) and Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956) on the ground that 
future performance was certain. See American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, supra, 
at 691 n.4. 
89 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 456, 75 Stat. 222 (1961). 
90 H.R. REP. No. 381, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
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tional reason for its decision which indicated that even if the 
taxpayer could show that the deferral of prepayments clearly re-
flected economic net income, it might nevertheless be rejected for 
tax purposes. The apparent denial of any opportunity to defer 
"prepaid income" may be found in the Court's construction of 
recent legislation. Sections 45291 and 46292 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, as originally enacted, contained the first legislative 
approval of the deferment of prepayments and the deduction of 
estimated future expenses. In 1955, these provisions were retro-
actively repealed because the estimated loss of revenue attributable 
to the newly-enacted provisions would have been much greater 
than estimated.93 The Court construed the enactment and repeal 
of these sections as indicating a legislative intent that no deferral 
of prepayments should be allowed unless specifically authorized. 
In strong dictum the Court said: 
"[T]he fact is that§ 452 for the first time specifically declared 
petitioner's system of accounting to be acceptable for income 
tax purposes, and overruled the long-standing position of the 
Commissioner and the courts to the contrary. And the repeal 
of the section the following year, upon insistence by the 
Treasury that the proposed endorsement of such tax ac-
counting would have a disastrous impact on the Government's 
revenue, was just as clearly a mandate from the Congress that 
petitioner's system was not acceptable for tax purposes."9\1 
Sections 452 and 462 would have clearly included those areas 
which the Court had specifically sought to distinguish. Conse-
quently, it may be argued that, logically, the decision in American 
Automobile Ass'n concludes the taxpayer's right to defer prepay-
ments, even where the taxpayer is required to perform his obliga-
tion at a fixed future date. This conclusion was further strength-
ened by the Court's disposition of Schlude v. Commissioner,95 
decided in the same term as American Automobile Ass'n. In 
Schlude, the Eighth Circuit factually distinguished Automobile 
Club v. Commissioner as follows: 
"Here, petitioners' obligation to provide services subsequent 
Ill Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 452, 68A Stat. 152. 
02 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 462, 68A Stat. 168. 
os Ch. 143, 69 Stat. 134 (1955). 
94 American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 695 (1961). 
ll5 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960). 
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to the tax year was fixed, definite and certain, thereby effec-
tively rebutting any contention that petitioners' method of 
deferral was purely artificial."96 
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded Schlude for further con-
sideration in the light of its decision in American Automobile 
Ass'n.97 After reconsideration, the Eighth Circuit vacated its de-
cision and affirmed the Tax Court since, in the court's language, 
petitioners' method of accounting did not, "for income tax pur-
poses, clearly reflect income."98 The Eighth Circuit had distin-
guished Schlude from Automobile Club for the same reason that 
the Supreme Court had distinguished Beacon and Schuessler from 
that case, a distinction that was followed in American Automobile 
Ass'n.99 Thus, it would appear from the Second Circuit's earlier 
evaluation of the accounting methods used in Schlude that those 
methods did not come within American Automobile Ass'n's pro-
hibition against arbitrary deferrals. However, section 452 would 
have applied to Schlude's facts; therefore, it may be speculated that, 
on remand, the court felt compelled to reject petitioner's account-
ing methods because of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
legislative history of that section. If this interpretation is deemed 
to control tax accounting, it would appear that any further attempt 
to apply generally accepted professional accounting methods to 
prepayments would be futile. Furthermore, American Automobile 
Ass' n may be expected to have a similar effect on situations in-
volving estimated future expenses, as the Court's interpretation of 
legislative intent would apply equally to the identical history of 
section 462 which had allowed the deduction of such expenses. 
III. TAX AccouNTING STANDARDS FOR PREPAID INCOME 
FROM THE SALE OF PROPERTY--AN ANOMALY 
Unlike prepayments made in connection with the sale of serv-
ices or the rental of property, the inclusion of prepayments from 
the sale of property must be deferred until the sale has been com-
pleted.100 While attempts have been made to distinguish the sale 
96 Id. at 241. 
97 368 U.S. 873 (1961). 
98 Schlude v. Commissioner, 296 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 370 U.S. 
902 (1962). (Emphasis added.) 
99 American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 691 n.4 (1961). 
100 See, e.g., Virginia Coal &: Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938); 
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of goods from the sale of services based on the nature of the trans-
action,101 it would seem that the distinction arises from the defini-
tion of gross income as used in section 451. "In a manufacturing, 
merchandising, or mining business, 'gross income' means the total 
sales, less the cost of goods sold ... .''102 Consequently, when prop-
erty is sold, prepayments cannot be included in gross income until 
the cost of the property sold can be ascertained and deducted from 
gross receipts in order to determine the amount to be included 
in the computation of taxable income.103 On the other hand, gross 
income from the sale of services or rental of property is equivalent 
to the gross receipts from such activities, which must be included 
in the computation of taxable income when received.104 This dis-
tinction was derived from the apparent requirement that capital 
be recovered before an income tax can be imposed.105 However, 
under the claim of right doctrine this distinction should have been 
insignificant because that doctrine treats funds received under a 
claim of right and without restriction as to their disposition as tax-
able income regardless of the type of transaction from which the 
funds are derived.106 Furthermore, the dissimilar treatment ac-
corded prepayments from the sale of property cannot be sustained 
under the reasoning set out in American Automobile Ass'n v. Com-
missioner,107 which has apparently rejected the claim of right doc-
trine.108 Section 452 expressly allowed the deferral of prepayments 
attributable to the sale of goods and the rental of property.109 Con-
Woodlawn Park Cemetery, 16 T.C. 1067 (1951); Veenstra &: De Haan Coal Co., 11 T.C. 
964 (1948), See also Behren, Prepaid Income-Accounting Concepts and the Tax Law, 
15 TAX L. REv. 343, 353 (1960); Goodhue, Claim of Right and Changes in .A.ccounting 
Method, N.Y.U. 18rn INST. ON FED. TAX. 209, 214 (1960), 
101 Veenstra &: De Haan Coal Co., supra note 100. 
102 Treas. Reg. § l.61-3(a) (1957). 
103 See, e.g., Virginia Coal &: Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938); 
Woodlawn Park Cemetery, 16 T.C. 1067 (1951); Veenstra &: De Haan Coal Co., 11 T.C. 
964 (1948); Summit Coal Co,, 18 B.T .A. 983 (1930); Sophia M. Garretson, 10 B.T .A. 1381 
(1928). The Commissioner may not anticipate the amount of gross income by deducting 
the estimated cost of sales; see Woodlawn Park Cemetery, supra. 
104 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 451; Treas. Reg. §§ l.61-2(a)l, l.61-8(a) (1957). 
105 Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918); Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal 
Co., 247 U.S. 189 (1918). 
100 See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzlement); Rutkin v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (extortion); United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) 
(bonus paid by mistake). 
107 367 U.S. 687, 694-97 (1961). 
108 Id. at 701 (dissenting opinion). 
100 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, ch. 736 § 452(e)2, 68A Stat, 152. 
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sequently, under the Court's interpretation of the legislative intent 
manifested by its repeal, prepayments from the sale of goods as well 
as the sale of services and the rental of property would seemingly be 
includible in the computation of taxable income when received.1l0 
The distinction between the sale of services and the sale of prop-
erty can raise difficult problems of classification, as illustrated by 
the recent case of Wallace A. Moritz,111 in which a photographer 
had received refundable deposits for portraits which were com-
pleted and accepted in the following ~axable year. The Tax Court 
required the deposits to be included in the current determination 
of taxable income on the theory that they were for the rendition 
of services rather than the sale of portraits.112 It is probable that 
similar problems of classification will be encountered whenever 
deposits are received in connection with the sale of products made 
to the customer's specifications, an arrangement frequently en-
countered. It has been suggested that such problems could be 
avoided by recognizing that there is no economic difference be-
tween the determination of income from the sale of property and 
the sale of services or the rental of property and, therefore, no basis 
for continuing the present distinction.113 
IV. THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
Prior to the decision in American Automobile Ass'n the ques-
tion of acceptable tax accounting methods for prepaid income and 
estimated future expenses was considered incapable of resolution.114 
The Commissioner and the Tax Court resisted the introduction 
of generally accepted accounting methods regardless of the situa-
tion in which the prepayment was received or the estimated future 
expense deducted.U5 The courts of appeals had rendered conflict-
110 The validity of the dissimilar treatment accorded to prepayments for goods has 
been seriously questioned. See Behren, supra note 100, at 354; Goodhue, supra note 100, 
at 214-15. 
111 21 T.C. 622 (1954). 
112 Id. at 624-25. 
113 Goodhue, supra note 100, at 215. 
114 See generally Behren, supra note 100; Krahmer, Taxation of Advance Receipts 
for Future Services, 1961 DuKE L.J. 230. 
115 Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 181. See, e.g., National Bread Wrapping Mach. Co., 
30 T.C. 550 (1958); E. W. Schuessler, 24 T.C. 247 (1955), rev'd, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 
1956); Wallace A. Moritz, 21 T.C. 622 (1954); Pacific Grape Prods. Co., 17 T.C. 1097 
(1952), rev'd, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955); Capital Warehouse Co., 9 T.C. 966 (1947), 
afj'd, 171 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1948). 
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ing decisions.116 In addition, separate standards prevailed for the 
treatment of prepayments from the sale of property and prepay-
ments from the sale of services and rental of property without ap-
parent economic justification.117 The decision in American Auto-
mobile Ass'n was based upon alternative grounds. One of these, 
dealing with the clarity of accounting procedure used, has been 
rejected by Congress. Furthermore, this reasoning did not purport 
to control accounting for prepayments and estimated expenses 
where non-contingent obligations had been incurred;118 nor did it 
dispose of the apparent anomaly regarding the sale of property. 
The other ground, based on legislative intent, would have disposed 
of the entire question. However, the Court was careful to discuss 
this asserted basis in dictum and restricted its decision to finding 
that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in rejecting 
the Association's accounting system.119 Insofar as the decision was 
limited, it cannot fairly be interpreted as resolving prior conflicting 
decisions. Thus, the need for legislation governing prepaid income 
and estimated future expenses cannot be underestimated. Con-
gressional resolution of these conflicting decisions is necessary to 
enable businessmen to make an intelligent choice between compet-
ing methods of obtaining payments for goods and services. The 
decision in American Automobile Ass'n placed the burden upon 
Congress to determine what relief, if any, shall be offered to tax-
payers who must account for prepayment or estimated future ex-
penses.120 The Court's failure to take more decisive action is not 
entirely unjustified. Many of the underlying policy reasons for and 
against the adoption of accounting methods which would allow 
the deferral of prepaid income and the deduction of estimated 
future expenses are not properly the subject of judicial recogni-
tion.121 
116 Cases cited notes 53 & 67 supra. 
117 See text at notes 100·14 supra. 
118 See text at notes 89 & 90 supra. 
119 American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 698 (1961). 
120 '"Ve must leave to the Congress the fashioning of a rule which, in any event, 
must have wide ramifications." Clark, J., in American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 
supra note 119, at 697. 
121 "The Committees of the Congress have standing committees expertly grounded 
in tax problems, with jurisdiction covering the whole field of taxation and facilities for 
studying considerations of policy as between the various ta.xpayers and the necessities 
of the general revenues." Ibid. 
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A. Effect of Present Tax Accounting Standards 
If income is the value added as a result of economic activity, it 
is clear that the present tax accounting rules do not in fact measure 
income as so defined. Instead, income for tax accounting purposes 
is measured from transactions undertaken and completed within 
the taxable year, increased by current prepayments for future 
services, and decreased by current expenditures incurred in earn-
ing prepayments reported in a prior taxable year. Under the pres-
ent tax accounting standards a new business receiving prepay-
ments incurs a higher tax in its initial year than it would if only 
the value added through its operations were measured. An estab-
lished business which enjoys increasing prepaid sales from year 
to year likewise pays a higher tax than would be incurred were it 
allowed to measure taxable income under the "value added" con-
cept; conversely, an established business with decreasing prepaid 
sales reports less taxable income than it actually earns. If, on the 
other hand, the amount of prepaid sales remains fairly constant 
from year to year, the present tax accounting standards result in 
the same computation of taxable income as would be computed 
under a method of accounting designed to measure income accord-
ing to the "value added" concept. 
Although the computation of the total income for the life of 
the business will be the same regardless of the accounting method 
used, the present rules hinder the organization of new businesses 
which receive substantial prepayments.122 These businesses must 
obtain additional capital to pay the additional tax they incur under 
the present tax accounting standards. It may be argued that the 
only hardship is the minimal cost of interest on the additional 
funds until the tax has been recaptured through deduction of the 
expenses incurred in earning the prepayments. This analysis dis-
regards the possibility that a new business may lack a sufficient 
credit standing to enable it to obtain capital for this purpose. A 
similar economic hardship is suffered by expanding businesses 
which receive sizeable prepayments. Instead of being able to re-
invest those funds used to pay the tax increment, the company 
must seek additional capital to finance further expansion. Again, 
the additional cost factor is limited to interest on the capital ob-
122 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS &: MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON 
INCOME TAX REVISION 646, 664 (Comm. Print 1960). 
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tained. However, since the additional capital will be needed as 
long as the business continues to expand, the cumulative annual 
interest charges could become prohibitive. Another adverse effect 
that may result from application of the present tax accounting rules 
is that individual taxpayers who receive prepayments may incur 
a greater total tax than those who do not, even though they may 
earn, in the "value added" sense, the same income from year to 
year. The difference in their tax burden results from application 
of the progressive income tax rates to the distorted income compu-
tations made in compliance with present tax accounting standards. 
Under these standards, the prepayments may well be taxed at a 
higher marginal rate than the marginal rate applicable to the last 
increment of income in the year in which the expenses are de-
ducted. A further economic hardship resulting from present tax 
accounting rules may be incurred when prepayments are used to 
finance the seller's future performance.123 Often this is the only 
financing method available. But under the present standards the 
unexpended portion of the prepayments is taxed as if it were in-
come; consequently, the attractiveness of financing through pre-
payments is significantly lessened. It would seem that these claims 
of hardship are sufficiently meritorious to indicate clearly the 
need for change in the present tax accounting rules. In response 
to this need, many authorities have expressed their belief that, as 
a solution, generally accepted accounting standards should be 
adopted for tax purposes.124 
B. Effect of the Adoption of Accounting Standards 
The adoption of professional accounting standards for pre-
payments and estimated future expenses would remove the present 
economic disadvantages incurred by taxpayers who have such re-
ceipts and expenses. The present Internal Revenue Code has 
granted these taxpayers limited relief in only two instances. Sec-
tions 455125 and 456126 allow the deferral of prepaid subscriptions 
123 Id. at 664; PATON 315. 
124 Cf. Behren, supra note 100, at 366; Berlfein, Tax vs. Commercial Accounting Con-
siderations in Reserve Accounts, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAX INST. 387, 411; Freeman, Tax 
Accrual Accounting for Contested Items, 56 MICH. L. REv. 727, 747 (1958); Krahmer, supra 
note 114, at 258. But cf. Schapiro, Tax Accounting for Prepaid Income and Reserves for 
Estimated Future Expenses, 2 T.AX REvlsION COMPENDIUM 1133, 1151 (House Ways &: 
Means Comm. 1959). 
125 INT, REv. CODE OF 1954, § 455. This section codified the decision in Beacon 
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955). 
126 See text at note 89 supra. 
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and prepaid membership dues; yet there is no significant economic 
difference which distinguishes these receipts from any other forms 
of prepayments. Thus, it may be surmised that these provisions 
merely indicate a congressional response to well-pleaded individual 
hardships.127 
The Government has opposed the extension of the advantages 
offered by 455 and 456 to taxpayers that do not come within their 
limited scope because it would place too great a burden on the 
Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. The burden incurred 
by the Treasury would be the loss in revenue that would be sus-
tained because of the change in accounting methods.128 Although 
the loss would be incurred only once, in the taxable year during 
which the change in accounting methods occurs, it would be sub-
stantial. This prospective loss in revenue resulted in the retro-
active repeal of sections 452 and 462 when it was belatedly esti-
mated that the loss might have reached one billion dollars.129 Also, 
allowing deferral of prepayments would obstruct the easy collection 
of taxes by making the Treasury stand the risk of the taxpayer's 
insolvency.130 This important consideration has led to the enact-
ment of withholding provisions,131 and the requirement of return-
ing estimated tax.132 Thirdly, it has been argued that the profes-
sional accounting standards should not be adopted because it 
would unduly burden the Internal Revenue Service with addi-
tional administrative problems:133 the time for the recognition of 
advance receipts is not clearly enough defined by professional ac-
counting rules.134 Finally, a shift to accounting principles has been 
resisted on the ground that the collection of taxes should not be 
made to depend on such standards because they are inherently con-
servative, thus tending to underestimate income.135 Thus, it ap-
pears that the Government has valuable interests in the continua-
tion of the present tax accounting standards even though they are 
a source of some hardship to the taxpayers who are required to use 
them. 
121 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1958). 
128 Behren, supra note 100, at 364; Krahmer, supra note 114, at 257. 
120 H.R. REP. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1955). 
130 Behren, supra note 100, at 363; Krahmer, supra note 114, at 259. 
131 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3401-04. 
132 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6153. 
133 Behren, supra note 100, at 364; Krahmer, supra note 114, at 258. 
134 Behren, supra note 100, at 364. 
135 Ibid. 
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C. Suggested Resolution of the Conflicting Interests 
It is apparent from the Code provisions which allow the deduc-
tion of substantially all business expenses that Congress intended 
to tax only net business income.136 Accordingly, the Government 
arguably has no legitimate interest in the continued application 
of accounting standards which do not accurately measure net in-
come. Although the present tax accounting standards for prepay-
ments and estimated future expenses should for this reason be 
abandoned, it does not necessarily follow that the applicable pro-
fessional accounting methods should be wholly adopted. While 
such accounting methods accurately measure net income, they 
should be subordinated to the Government's interests in protecting 
and insuring adequate sources of revenue. The Government's 
needs are illustrated by its interest in collectibility of taxes and ease 
in administering the federal tax system. 
With respect to the taxation of unearned prepayments, it would 
seem that the interests of both Government and taxpayer could best 
be protected through the return of an estimated tax on income to 
be earned in the performance of future obligations. The idea of 
returning estimated tax has proved workable in other situations.137 
The assessment of estimated tax would require the taxpayer to 
estimate the cost of earning prepayments and deduct this amount 
in order to estimate the net income from such transactions. The 
estimated expenses should be deducted even though the obligation 
to incur them may be contingent or disputed; 138 so long as the esti-
mate of net income is reasonably accurate the interests of the 
Government would be fully protected. Once an accurate estimate 
of net income is obtained, the problem of determining an appro-
priate tax rate remains to be resolved. It is suggested that the esti-
mated net income be returned at the marginal rate applicable to 
earned income reported in the year the prepayment is received. 
This would eliminate the additional problem of guessing the 
marginal rate that would be applicable to the estimated income in 
the year it is earned. When the income from the prepayments is 
actually earned, it would be included in the determination of tax 
for that year and a credit would be taken for the estimated tax 
136 IlITIKER, FEDERAL INCOME EsrATE AND GIFT TAXATION 193 (1958). 
137 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6015, 6016. 
138 See text at notes 56 & 57 supra. 
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previously paid. This mode of computing net income and the tax 
thereon ,is consistent with generally accepted accounting principles 
to the eitent that it matches revenues with related expenses. How-
ever, where professional accountants would defer the recognition 
of income, this method estimates income and returns the tax at the 
time the taxpayer receives cash, thus protecting the Government's 
interest in collectibility. 
The Government's interest in ease of administration could also 
be protected under accounting methods which provide for the re-
turn of estimated tax. Proper accounting for estimated income 
would require the taxpayer to establish a reserve for the expenses 
to be incurred. A separate reserve could be established for the un-
earned prepayments at the end of each taxable year. As these pre-
payments are earned the expenses incurred would be charged 
against the reserve leaving a terminal balance in the reserve, a 
feature not found in present reserve accounts.139 This terminal 
balance would indicate the error in the estimate of income, there-
by facilitating audit. Since, in a business setting, estimates of the 
cost of earning prepayments are made as a normal incident to the 
determination of prices and production schedules, it would be 
reasonable for the Internal Revenue Service to demand a high 
degree of accuracy. As an added impetus to accurate estimation, 
taxpayers should be allowed to pay the amount by which the tax 
is underestimated without paying any interest or penalty if the 
estimate of net income was at least 90 percent of the amount ac-
tually earned.140 If the estimate of net income should fall below 
90 percent, and there is no evidence of bad faith, the taxpayer 
should be allowed to pay the amount by which the tax was under-
estimated with interest thereon at the statutory rate of six percent. 
If the estimate was so inaccurate as to indicate bad faith, the Gov-
ernment should be able to assert its criminal or civil fraud penal-
ties.141 Under such a system of penalties it is hoped that the tax-
payer's self-interest would inhibit the deduction of expenses which 
are not fairly allocable to earning prepayments. To further ease 
the administrative burden, taxpayers should have an adequate cost 
139 See, e.g., INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 166(c). 
140 Under present standards the taxpayer incurs no interest obligation if its Estimated 
Tax paid equals at least 70% of its actual tax liability. See INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, 
§§ 6654(d), 6655(d). 
141 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6653. 
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accounting system as a prerequisite to returning estimated tax. This 
would be necessary to protect the integrity of the terminal balance 
as an indicator of errors in estimating income. Where the taxpayer 
has obligated itself to deliver a fairly standardized product or 
render a standardized service, a cost accounting system based on 
process cost or average cost should be sufficiently accurate. On the 
other hand, where the taxpayer sells diverse products or services, 
a unit cost accounting system may be required.142 A further limita-
tion on the return of estimated tax should be one in terms of time. 
Both the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers would seem to 
have an interest in being able to close off transactions of prior years. 
Thus, it is suggested that the return of estimated tax on income 
from prepayments be denied unless it can be credited against the 
taxpayer's tax liability within the present three-year statute of 
limitations.143 Also, once an election to return an estimated tax is 
made, the taxpayer should not be able to rescind it without prior 
permission of the Commissioner. This would be necessary in order 
to prevent the taxpayer from returning to the present accounting 
standards in years with fewer prepaid sales in order to reduce his 
taxes. 
It should be noted that this method of accounting for prepay-
ments is similar to the professional accounting method of handling 
estimated future expenses.144 Consequently, it would be consistent 
to adopt such accounting standards as are applicable to those ex-
penses. That portion of current receipts which corresponds to 
the cost of providing future services would be recognized when 
received, with a simultaneous deduction of estimated future ex-
penses. 
While this solution is in effect a compromise with generally 
accepted principles, since designed to protect the Government's 
interests, it also removes much of the economic hardship incurred 
under the present rules. Rather than tax the total receipts from 
prepayments, only the tax on the estimated net income from such 
receipts would have to be returned. Thus, the taxpayer would be 
left with the bulk of the cash received and would not have to look 
elsewhere to obtain means of financing. Furthermore, since tax-
payers receiving prepayments would be taxed on their net income 
142 See generally AMORY, ACCOUNTING 530-69 (2d ed. 1953). 
148 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 65Ol(a). 
144 See text at notes 23-32 supra. 
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when it is actually earned, there would be no possibility that they 
might incur greater total taxes than other taxpayers. 
To make adoption of this proposed solution economically and 
politically feasible it would be necessary to soften the impact of 
the loss of revenue that would be incurred due to the change in 
accounting methods. The failure to supply an adequate transitional 
adjustment resulted in the repeal of sections 452 and 462 of the 
1954 Code.145 However, since the loss would be non-recurring, it 
would be possible to spread it over a sufficient number of years 
to reduce the annual decrease in revenue to manageable propor-
tions.146 Once this obstacle has been overcome, there seems to be 
no sufficient reason barring the adoption of an estimated tax on 
net income from prepayments and professional accounting stand-
ards for estimated future expenses. 
Jerome M. Salle, S.Ed. 
1415 See text at notes 91-93 supra. 
146 A discussion of the technical aspects of such a device is beyond the scope of 
this comment. 
